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Book Reviews
READINGS

IN JURISPRUDENCE. Selected, edited and arranged by Jerome Hall.
Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1938. Pp. xix, 1183.

Professor Hall has done an excellent piece of work in bringing together,
within the compass of one thick volume, a representative selection of ideas about
the nature of law and its place in the modern state. His excerpts range from
Plato and Aristotle to the twentieth century theories of the social scientists and
the neorealists in jurisprudence. Professor Hall has evidently selected ideas on
the basis of their present vitality, their continuing effects upon the ideas about
law which play a part in American society of the present day. Professor Hall
is right in believing, as I understand him to believe, that a selection of readings
on jurisprudence for law students should emphasize the ideas which are likely
to influence the next generation of lawyers and judges, legislators and administrators. The large amount of space given to juristic and sociological writings of
the twentieth century is explained as resulting from this belief. The relative
brevity of the excerpts from the older writings on jurisprudence is justified on
this ground, as well as on the ground that selection of the significant ideas is
comparatively easier. One needs only a few penetrating lines from Aristotle to
exhibit the significant ideas which he has contributed to modern thought. The
law student is likely to find that Aristotle, like "Hamlet," is "too full of quotations". With the newer theories of law selection is not as easy, for how can one
tell, in the midst of a change, who will ultimately survive to be the leaders of a
later generation? Yet Professor Hall has scrupulously tried to represent all
points of view (even some that I might have left out) and I can think of no
significant movement or set ideas about law, whether of major or minor importance, which is not in one way or another represented in his Readings. The
only omission worthy of mention is political philosophy, the theory of the state,
which by a conventional division of labor is in this country taught by faculties
of political science rather than faculties of law. Professor Hall has wisely
minimized this type of material, which is adequately represented in other compilations designed for political scientists. The practitioner and judge, the law
student, and possibly even the layman who reads with persistence and perspicacity,
can find here an adequate and stimulating introduction to the general theories of,
or about, law.
Without guidance, the uninitiated reader will find this book tough reading.
Professor Hall has furnished a good deal of guidance in his table of contents and
in his excellent supplemental bibliographies. The table of contents divides the
excerpts into three main parts: I. Philosophy of Law. II. Analytical Jurisprudence. III. Law and Social Science. The first two parts have 335 pages each,
while the third occupies 500 pages. Yet a good deal of the material in the third
part may be classed as definitely "legal" (e. g., the selections on the Judicial
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Process) and the bias in favor of social science material is not as great as might
first appear. Another guide to the general reader is in the chapter headings.
Thus the first six chapters are entitled, respectively, Natural Law, Historical
Jurisprudence, Transcendental Idealism, Utilitarianism, Social Functionalism,
and Pragmatism. One may quarrel with some of the chapter headings, but it is
not easy to find better ones. Thus, "Transcendental Idealism" may seem to include
more than Kant, Stammler and Kelsen; yet there seems to be no particular gain
in labeling this group of writers as "Kantian and neo-Kantian." In other instances
the chapter heading is such that excerpts under other headings might as well
be included here. Yet this difficulty is inherent in the cross-grain character of the
excerpts themselves, and in the editor's broad conception of the scope of jurisprudence.
Professor Hall has taken jurisprudence to embrace all general theories of,
or about, law. To one who was introduced to jurisprudence, as I was, through
the writings of Austin and Holland, it may seem an undue extension of the term
to include the philosophy and sociology of law as a part of jurisprudence. Yet
the more inclusive use of the term is justified by good usage (such as Professor
Pound's course in Jurisprudence) and by those considerations of practical expediency which should be the test of linguistic usage. The growing and now
maturing body of American law needs the guidance of general ideas about law,
and jurisprudence, like the magic tent of the Oriental tale, should be broad
enough to include them all. If we must dispute (as I hope we shall), it is better
to dispute about whether an idea is a good idea or a poor one, rather than about
whether it is entitled to come under the tent of jurisprudence.
The result, of course, is that Professor Hall's selections do not present
any sustained theory of jurisprudence. They cannot, without a good deal of
mangling and face-lifting, be squeezed into any unified scheme of subordination
and super-ordination. This I take to be a virtue rather than a defect in a selection
of readings. The ideas which move men in our legal and political world are a
pluralistic set, and the mature student of jurisprudence should be exposed to
these ideas in all their diffuseness. From them he can select and order his own
philosophy of law. The best kind of philosophy for him to have is one that he
makes his own. For these reasons, a wide-ranging set of excerpts seems to me
preferable to one or two complete "systems" of legal theory as a means of introducing the student to jurisprudence. Limitations of time and expense make it
impossible to present fully the theories of each of the dozen or more men who have
most influenced jurisprudence, and there is the further objection, alluded to above,
that current movements would have to be left out.
Of course this selection of readings will not teach itself. It needs to be
supplemented by lectures or discussions which will help the student to understand
the various writers in relation to each other. The shift in interest and emphasis
from one writer to another can be detected only if one notes that one writer pays
little or no attention to what another considers to be essential. In two respects
I could wish that Professor Hall had given the teacher more help in using the
book. One is a set of biographical notes on the most important men. One can
understand Kant's stern idealism better, I think, if one knows that he had a
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Scotch grandfather, was a bachelor, and never traveled more than a hundred miles
from Koenigsberg. Another aid would have been a few footnotes pointing out
that the same words are used in different senses by different writers. Yet these
are counsels of perfection.
. To correct the impression that the book consists wholly of excerpts from books
and articles previously published, I must add that Professor Hall has included
some judicial decisions, and several essays not previously published. The selection of cases on custom (pp. 878-896) and on "idealism in the judicial process"
(pp. 287-306) are well chosen. The article on the syllogism by Mr. Treusch (pp.
539-560) is an excellent adaptation of logical theory to legal propositions. Miss
North's note on judicial fact-finding (pp. 1138-1150) should prove valuable to
practitioners and judges as well as to students. The book has a very good index.
On the whole, Professor Hall has produced a scholarly and useful compilation
which may not only help the law student and the lawyer to understand better
his daily tasks, but may also enable him, as Holmes said, to "catch an echo of the
infinite."
Columbia University Law School

EDWIN W. PATIMrSON

HANDBOox oF AMERcAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (HoRNBooK SgRms). By Henry
Rottschaefer. St. Paul: West Publishing Company, 1939. Pp. xxxv, 982.
A hornbook in constitutional law is essentially a contradiction in terms, and
this reviewer has serious doubts about the value of any hornbook on so complex,
so controversial, so elusive, and so rapidly changing a field of the law. Because
of the inevitable inadequacy of the treatment of such a subject in hornbook
fashion, the product is certain to be something less than a satisfactory tool in
the hands of the beginning student, while the more mature will be fully aware
of the necessity for more exhaustive study. Perhaps the possibility that this sort
of presentation will reach more people than a more exhaustive treatise and thus
diffuse somewhat more widely even a limited understanding of this difficult and
important field of the law amply justifies the effort. It is, of course, of no little
value, as a source from which to start working, to have collected statements of
the principles of constitutional law as set forth in the decided cases, with appropriate case citations. But if those principles are to be regarded as ultimate,
without any consideration of the many and varied factors that lie back of the
cases, as it is the wont of the hornbook student to do, the tool may, in many cases,
become a two-edged sword. Constitutional law just does not lend itself to the
hornbook method of study.
It should be said in this connection, however, that Mr. Rottschaefer has done
much-perhaps as much as anyone could do and yet stay within the confines of
hornbook publication-to avoid the dogmatic and categorical statements of principles which make up the "horns" of the typical hornbook. The reader is adequately warned of this danger in the introduction. Reference to. a single passage may
suffice to make this clear.
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"The language of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution has remained unchanged since its
adoption, but the actual extent to which it has limited activities of the
states has varied so greatly that doubts have sometimes arisen as to the
possibility of discovering in it any limiting principle other than
that
constituted by judicial conceptions of the desirable social order."1
Perhaps the implications in that passage alone would have been sufficient
to frighten a less bold individual from his task. The introduction is an excellent
one and does much to warn the reader of the complex nature of the problems
to be considered and to convey an appreciation of the fact that no adequate notion
of the subject matter can be formed by a superficial study of the bold-faced type.
Perhaps it might better have been labeled "Chapter I" instead of "Introduction"
as a possible means of assuring that it would be more widely read.
Even before the introduction the author gets off to a good start by printing
in readable type at the front of the volume a copy of the Constitution with the
formal amendments thereto. Any subject concerning which so many people are
willing to speak with an appearance of authority, and about which so few people
are really well prepared to speak, is properly introduced by placing the document
itself in a position to encourage reading. The average individual too frequently
goes on the assumption that he knows "in a general way" what the Constitution
contains. The situation is somewhat comparable to that of the average college
sophomore entering upon a course in American Government. He is likely to make
the almost always violent assumption that he has a fair working knowledge of the
principles on which our governments, state and national, are based. Events in
recent years amply have testified to the existence of an assumption on the part of
substantially everyone-of sophomore rank or otherwise-that he has a considerable knowledge of constitutional law which he is willing to parade on the
platform or in the press on the slightest provocation. If Mr. Rottschaefer's device
of printing a copy of the Constitution first has the effect of causing more people
into whose hands this volume comes to read that document at least once, the
device is greatly to be commended.
What has been suggested above as to the utter inadequacy of hornbook treatment of this subject may be illustrated by many passages from the book. In the
section dealing with reciprocal immunity of the state and national governments
from taxation by each other, the status of officers and employees is disposed of in
a single sentence.
"Its officers and employees are held to constitute so integral a part
of the governmental machinery through which it directly exercises its
powers that their income from their office or employment may not be
taxed by the other."2
For this authoritative proposition the author cites Dobbins v. Commissioners
of Erie County,3 and Collector v. Day.4 This cannot be charged to have been incorrect, since the case of Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe,5 repudiating the

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

P. 2.
P. 101.
16 Pet. 435 (U. S. 1842).
11 Wall. 113 (U. S. 1871).
306 U. S. 466 (1939).
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doctrine and overruling earlier cases was not decided until March, 1939, while
the preface of this book is dated January of the same year. However, the handwriting on the wall was sufficiently plain that all who ran might read the impending doom of these cases long before January, 1939. Any such categorical
statement could not fail to mislead the uninitiated in this field of the law.
It is probable that the black letter principles asserted, that
"Congress may not use its power to levy taxes for the primary purpose of regulating a matter whose regulation lies within the exclusive
competence of the states" and "the mere fact that Congress may have had
an incidental motive in levying the tax other than the raising of revenue0
does not invalidate it if its primary purpose was the raising of revenue,"1
though probably gleaned from the language of some Supreme Court opinion, are
calculated to be misleading in view of the absence of any attempt to explain
such eases as MoCray v. United States,7 and United States v. Doremus.8
Section 127, headed "Taxation of Federal Judicial, and Presidential,
Salaries," 9 certainly invites criticism, though perhaps it is more largely a criticism
of the hornbook method than of the accuracy of the author's treatment. It is
true that the law of the Supreme Court as evidenced in the opinions in Evans V.
Gore10 and Miles v. Graham," corresponded with the teachings of this section,
1
and had not yet (by four months) been repudiated by O'Malley v. Woodrough, 2
but the doubtful soundness (to put it mildly) of the doctrine, and the refusal of
most other courts's to accept it might well have been pointed out in any treatise
intended to guide beginning students in this treacherous field of the law.
The author's discussion of Colgate v. Harvey,14 and the privileges and immunities of national citizenship,' 5 with a bare admission that there was a dissenting opinion, is probably calculated to create the erroneous impression of a well
established and accepted doctrine, instead of one widely regarded as of doubtful
soundness which has since been completely repudiated by the Court.16
Section 283, entitled "State Jurisdiction to Impose Taxes,"'17 is for the most
part a very useful discussion, but certain passages therein appear calculated to
convey an erroneous impression to the beginning student who is likely to make
use of such a text book. On page 639 occur the following statements:
"It (the Court) has stated that, whereas the taxing power of a state
encounters that of other states at its borders, there is no such limitation

6. P. 175.
7. 195 U. S.27 (1904).
8. 249 U. S.86 (1919).
9. Pp. 202, 203.
10. 253 U. S. 245 (1920).
11. 268 U. S.501 (1925).
12. 307 U. S. 277 (1939).
13. See eases collected in the dissenting opinion of Chief Judge Bond of
the Court of Appeals of Maryland in Gordy v. Dennis, 5 A. (2d) 69, 82 (Md.
1939), and notes 6 and 8 to the opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in O'Malley v.
Woodrough, 307 U. S. at 281.
14. 296 U. S.404 (1935).
15. Pp. 448, 449.
16. In the recent case of Madden v. Kentucky, 60 Sup. Ct. 406 (U. S.1940),
the case of Colgate v. Harvey is expressly overruled.
17. Pp. 638-663.
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upon the national power. 18 This has led a few state courts to adopt the
position that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does
not prohibit a state from subjecting to its inheritance tax the transfer
of intangible personalty owned by an alien decedent dying domiciled in
a foreign country under circumstances under which that clause would
prohibit such tax
in the case of a decedent dying domiciled within another
of the states."19
These statements appear to be correct. But they are followed by the assertion
that
"the theory implicit in these decisions is that protection of the taxing
power of one state against encroachment by another state is the sole
premise from which the jurisdictional limits on a state's taxing power are
to be derived. It also necessarily implies that the due process clause
protects an alien taxpayer who is a resident of a foreign country against
arbitrary exactions through purported exercises of a state's taxing power
only so far as necessary to protect the taxing power of another state
having a superior claim to impose a like tax. There are many situations
in which a state might tax a resident alien or a resident citizen in a
wholly arbitrary manner without trenching upon the superior claims of
another state to tax him or his property, such as taxing him on his realty
owned in a foreign country. If the sole purpose of the due process clause
is to protect the taxing power of other states, such a tax would not violate
it.,,20

With all due deference to a scholar of Mr. Rottschaefer's standing in the field
of constitutional and taxation law, it is submitted that the cited cases imply
no such absurd doctrine. Both the McCreery and Lloyd cases, to which the above
criticism is directed, are based upon the interpretation which the California and
Washington courts placed upon the opinion of the United States Supreme Court
in Burnet v. Brooks,21 which latter case is nowhere adequately discussed in the
treatise under review. 22 This interpretation seems to the reviewer to be an entirely reasonable one and gives rise to no such implication as the above quotation
sets forth.
A proper understanding of this matter requires a brief resum6 of the
development of the doctrines of the United States Supreme Court with respect
to state jurisdiction to tax prior to the decision of the case of Burnet v. Brooks. In
1905, in the case of Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky,23 the court held
that it violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment for the
state of the owner's domicile to impose a property tax on tangible personal property with an actual physical situs outside the territory of the taxing state. The
reasoning of the court was primarily in terms of the existence or non-existence of
jurisdiction as that term was then understood. The emphasis was placed on the
proposition that when the property has a permanent situs outside the taxing
state such state is not in a position to afford any of the protection for which
a property tax is supposed to be paid, which protection can be afforded only
by the state wherein the property is located. Inability of the domiciliary state

18. Citing United States v. Bennett, 232 U. S. 299 (1914), and Cook v.
Tait, 265 U. S. 47 (1924).
19. Citing In re McCreery's Estate, 220 Cal. 26, 29 P. (2d) 186 (1934),
and In re Lloyd's Estate, 185 Wash. 61, 52 P. (2d) 1269 (1936).
20. Pp. 639, 640.
21. 288 U. S.378 (1933).
22. See pp. 207, 208.
23. 199 U. S. 194 (1905).
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to afford protection negatived the existence of jurisdiction to tax. Only minor
emphasis was placed on the matter of the desirability of getting away from
multiple state taxation of such property. In 1925 the Court applied the same
doctrine, with similar emphasis, to state inheritance taxation.2 ' In 1930 to 1932
the court set forth its doctrine of the invalidity, under due process, of multiple
state taxation of intangibles in three inheritance tax cases. 2 5 The emphasis of
the court was shifted in these cases from one of jurisdiction based on relationship
to the subject of the tax, to the evils of multiple state taxation entirely. In the
last of these three cases, First NationalBank of Boston v. Maine, the Court did
not look into the relationship of the taxing state to the subject of the tax-the
transfer by inheritance of shares of stock in a domestic corporation on the death
of a non-resident shareholder-to see whether a sufficient basis existed to justify
the tax, but made the broad assertion that "shares of stock, like the other
intangibles, constitutionally can be subjected to a death transfer tax by one state
only. '26 The remaining question, then, was merely to determine which of those
states claiming the right to tax had the better basis. This was done in favor of
the state of domicile by applying the maxim mobilia sequuntur personam, as in
Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota and Baldwin v. Missouri. In none of
these cases was it determined that the state attempting to tax did not bear such
a relationship to the subject of the tax as to constitute a reasonable basis for
taxation, but rather that, as matter of policy and desirability-justice to the
taxpayer, if one prefers-only one state should be permitted to tax, and it was
the business of the court to pick out that one. Necessarily that must be the
approach, or a different conclusion would see to be inevitable, at least in Baldwin
v. Missouri and First NationalBank of Boston v. Maine. In Baldwin v. Missouri,
the property, to the transfer of which Missouri sought to apply her inheritance
tax, consisted of promissory notes made by residents of Missouri and secured
by mortgages upon Missouri real estate, which notes were kept in Missouri;
United States bonds kept in Missouri; and deposits in Missouri banks. The
owner died domiciled in Illinois. Since this property enjoyed the protection of
Missouri laws, and since it was necessary to take out ancillary letters of administration in Missouri and thus invoke the laws of Missouri in order to effectuate
the transfer, it would have been very difficult to conduct an inquiry into the
relationship of Missouri to the subject of the tax in terms of previous conceptions
of jurisdiction and fail to arrive at the conclusion that jurisdiction for tax purposes existed. In view of the relationship of the property and its transfer to both
states, the other proposition, that it is so far arbitrary for two states to tax
at the same time as to call for invalidity of one tax under the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, met with vigorous protest at the time as being
constitutionally unsound, and has never been acquiesced in by the full court. 27

24. Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U. S. 473 (1925).
25. Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U. S.204 (1930), Baldwin
v. Missouri, 281 U. S. 586 (1930), and First National Bank of Boston v. Maine,
284 U. S.312 (1932).
26. 284 U. S. at 328. Italics supplied.
27. Witness the dissenting opinions of Justices Holmes, Brandeis and. Stone
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The case of Burnet v. Brooks28 involved facts almost'identical with Baldwin
v. Missouri except that the decedent was an alien who died domiciled abroad
and the problem involved was the application of the federal estate tax rather
than a state inheritance tax. The securities involved were being kept in New
York but were not connected with any business conducted there on behalf of the
decedent. The Court there pointed out that the statute involved was passed
several years before the cases of the 1930-32 period 29 limiting state power to tax
and at a time when the doctrine was well established that presence of the paper
evidence was sufficient basis for the taxation of such securities, and that the
statute in terms embracing all property "situated in the United States", must
be construed to include them. The Court then asserted that these securities must
be regarded as being "within the jurisdiction of the United States",30 and expressly recognized that "jurisdiction may exist in more than one government
based on distinct grounds."' 31 The contention was made that the due
process clause of the Fifth Amendment had the same force as that of the
Fourteenth with respect to the states and that cases like Baldwin v. Missouri and
First National Bank of Boston v. Maine required a denial of the taxing power in
this case. This the Court rejected saying that
"the limits of State power are defined in view of the relation of the States
to each other in the Federal Union", and that "these decisions established
that proper regard for the relation of the States in our system required
that the property under consideration should be taxed in 3 only one
State, and that jurisdiction to tax was restricted accordingly. 2
Then the Court asserted that
"this principle . . ., limiting the jurisdiction of the States 33to
tax,
does not restrict the taxing power of the Federal Government. S And
again, "the decisive point is that the criterion of state taxing power
by virtue of the relation of the States to each other under the Constitution is not the criterion of the taxing power of the United States by
virtue of its sovereignty in relation to the property of nonresidents." 3 4
Thus, since the Court asserted that the property was "within the jurisdiction
of the United States," and "was property within the reach of the power
which the United States by virtue of its sovereignty could exercise", 85 and this
by virtue of the presence of the securities in New York; and if the difference in
limitations on state and national government as to taxation rests on the relationship of the states to each other so that two states may not tax at the same time;
may it not reasonably be concluded that New York, where the securities were
located, under whose laws they were being protected, and whose laws must be

in Baldwin v. Missouri and First National Bank of Boston v. Maine, and that of
Justices Holmes and Brandeis in Farmers Loan and Trust Co. v. Minnesota, as
well as the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Stone in this last mentioned case.
28. 288 U. S. 378 (1933).
29. Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U. S.204 (1930), Baldwin
v. Missouri, 281 U. S.586 (1930), and First National Bank of Boston v. Maine,
284 U. S.312 (1932).
30. 288 U. S. at 396.
31. Id. at 399.
32. Id. at 401.
33. Id. at 403.
34. Id. at 405.
35. Id. at 396.
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invoked in order to effectuate the transfer, might likewise tax, no other state
being in a position to advance a claim to the right to tax. Such was the basis
of the reasoning in the MoCreery and Lloyd cases8 O criticised in the text. So far
from intimating that there were no limits on the state's taxing power aside from
the superior claim of a sister state and the invalidity of multiple state taxation, as
suggested in the treatise under review, these courts were both at some pains to
point out that a basis of jurisdiction identical with that in Burnet v. Brooks
existed; that prior to the 1930-32 cases that was a recognized basis of state taxing
jurisdiction; and since, according to the Supreme Court opinion in Burnet V.
Brooks, the limitations set up by those cases on state power were based entirely
on the conflict with the taxing power of another state, the former doctrine of
jurisdiction for state taxation should still exist where no other state was in a
position to claim a right to tax. That process of reasoning with respect to state
taxation appears to the reviewer to be the only one consistent with the opinion
in Burnet v. Brooks. The broader jurisdiction of the national government based
on citizenship which sustained the taxes in United States v. BennetV7 and Cook
v. Tait3 s cannot explain Burnet 'v.Brooks. It is merely a recognition of jurisdiction to tax based on the presence within the territorial jurisdiction of the
securities, a basis that had never been questioned by the Supreme Court except in
the ease of a state where the decedent died domiciled in a sister state and
multiple state taxation would result. The state in the situation here under consideration was resting its claim to jurisdiction on exactly the same basis as did
the national government in Burnet v. Brooks. That such a claim is not likely to
be denied in the future is strongly indicated by a passage in Mr. Justice Stone's
opinion in the recent case of Curry v. MeCanless, asserting that,
'ifthe 'due process' of the Fifth Amendment . . . does not require
us to fix a single exclusive place of taxation of intangibles for the
benefit of their foreign owner, who is entitled to its protection (citing
Burnet v. Brooks), the Fourteenth can hardly be thought to make us
do so here. . ..,39
This case and Graves v. Elliott,4o both involving two states applying their
inheritance taxes to the transfer of the same trust property, certainly very
drastically restrict, if they do not presage the complete repudiation of, the doctrine
set up by the 1930-32 cases discussed above.
It is probable that the discussion of "Property Taxes-Intangible Property" 1
is calculated to leave some confusion in the mind of the uninitiated. It is
asserted that,
"it has never yet been decided that a state may always tax intangible
personalty on the sole basis of the owner's domicile therein. It has, however, been stated that it may generally be taxed on that basis but that

36.
Lloyd's
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

In re MeCreery's Estate, 220 Cal. 26, 29 P. (2d) 186 (1934), and In ro
Estate, 185 Wash. 61, 52 P. (2d) 1269 (1936).
232 U. S. 299 (1914).
265 U. S.47 (1924).
307 U. S.357, 369, 370 (1939).
307 U. S.383 (1939).
Pp. 647-650.
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there is an exception
42 thereto in favor of the state in which intangibles
are kept and used."
Perhaps the restrictions of hornbook mechanics are responsible for the failure
to cite and discuss such cases as Cream of Wheat Co. v. County of Grand
Forks,43 holding that the state of a corporation's domicile may tax all of its
intangible property value although the corporation owns no real or tangible
personal property in, and does no business in the domiciliary state, and to explain
that of the cited cases-Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Fox 44 and FirstBank Stock Corp.
v. Minnesota45--only the first contains dicta to support the text statement, and
the second, expressly avoiding any commitment on the matter, appears to intimate
that probably such intangibles may be taxed in both states.48 What appears to be
intimated in that case is expressly asserted in Mr. Justice Stone's majority
opinion in Curry V. McCanless47 where he expressly reasserts the doctrine of the
Cream of Wheat case.' 8 While the text statements were not technically incorrect
when written, they certainly portrayed something less than an adequate picture
of a rather troublesome problem.
The numerous criticisms suggested in this review are, no doubt, primarily due
to the restrictions imposed by the necessity of conforming to hornbook treatment.
Any adequate presentation of the troublesome and controversial problems of
constitutional law requires a rather complete analysis of the various factors
involved in many decisions and the varying points of view responsible for majority
and dissenting opinions. Undoubtedly the research involved in the preparation
of the present volume included the making of such analysis in most cases and a
consideration of those varying points of view. It is unfortunate that Mr. Rottschaefer did not direct his recognized ability and 'wide experience to the task of
writing a more exhaustive treatise which would have been of vastly greater value
to the profession.
The present work is to be commended for its high degree of freedom from
inaccuracies in a field where inaccuracies are extremely difficult to avoid, and is,
perhaps, as good as any hornbook in constitutional law could be expected to be.
A rather valuable, though not exhaustive, bibliography of law review materials is included in the back of this volume, arranged according to chapters
to enhance its usefulness. It is unfortunate, however, that footnote citations
to these materials were not made throughout the volume. In this way the inadequacies of hornbook treatment could have been measurably overcome.
A pocket is attached to the back cover of this volume indicating a purpose

42. P. 647.
43. 253 U. S. 325 (1920). While this case was decided before the 1930-32
cases restrictive of state taxation, its holding has never been repudiated by the
court.
44. 298 U. S.193 (1936).
45. 301 U. S. 234 (1937).
46. 301 U. S. at 237, 239, 240, 241.
47. 307 U. S. 357 (1939).
48. 307 U. S. at 368. The Cream of Wheat case is also cited with approval in
First Bank Stock Corp. v. Minnesota.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol5/iss3/5
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to provide periodic supplements in an effort to keep the treatise abreast of change.
This should add very materially to its value. A sizeable supplement is already
due to take account of the many changes during the first year.
University of Missouri School of Law

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1940

ROBEaT L. HowARD
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